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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Co. v. Alaska Barge Co., 79 Wash. 216, 140 Pac. 334 (1914) ; Locomotive Exchange v.
Rucker Bros., 106 Wash. 278, 179 Pac. 859 (1919).
Pensions-Pension Statutes as Imposed Obligations of a Contractual Nature.
The case of Bakenhus v. Seattle, 48 Wn2d 695, 296 P2d 536 (1956), was an action by a
former city policeman for an increase in his statutory pension. P began employment with
the D city's police force in 1925. At that time a statute provided, inter alia, that a
policeman for a first class municipality was eligible for retirement with a life pension
after twenty-five years of service. The statute fixed the pension rate at one-half of
the salary attached to the rank held by the retiring policeman for the year immediately
preceding retirement. The pension fund was to be composed of compulsory non-
refundable contributions by the members of the force, and matching funds contributed
by the municipality. However, in 1937 this statute was amended. As amended it
provided for various additional fringe benefits, but changed the formula for ascertaining
the maximum pension payable to any retiring member. Under this amended formula no
member could receive more than $125 per month (which in 1947 was an amount equal
to one-half of the monthly salary of a police captain), and in no case were the member's
contributions to exceed an amount equal to 2% of the salary rate at which the maximum
pension was payable. In 1943 P was made a captain at a salary of $370 per month, yet
his pension contributions were deducted as if his salary were only $250 per month.
This was the proper procedure under the 1937 statute. In 1950 P retired and was
awarded the maximum pension payable under the 1937 statute, $125 per month. P then
began an action to compel D city to increase his pension to $185 per month, which
amount was the proper amount as calculated under the statute in force in 1925 when P
began work. P contended that his pension rights were to be determined by this 1925
statute, and that the 1937 amendment was void as to him.
Held, for P. The payments provided for by either statute were not gratuities, but
were deferred compensation for services. The 1925 statute was therefore regarded as
imposing upon the city an obligation of a contractual nature, and imparting to P a
correlative right, both of which accrued at the time P began employment. The 1925
statute was thought to be part of P's contract of employment; consequently, the 1937
amendment was held void as to P apparently on the ground that it violated the con-
stitutional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligations of contracts. Follow-
ing various California decisions, the court stated that the right to a pension, though
conditional, accrues at the time employment is begun, and that subsequent legislation is
ineffective to alter that right unless such legislation is reasonably necessary to maintain
the flexibility and integrity of the system.
The dissenting opinion questioned the existence of any contract of employment, and
maintained that even if one were presumed, P could be deemed to have assented to its
modification since he acquiesced in the diminution of his contribution to the fund.
A critical discussion of the conflicting theories utilized by various courts to resolve
similar statutory pension problems may be found in 56 CoLTum. L. REv. 251 (1956).
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Redelivery Bond-Waiver of Rights. In the recent case of Adams
v. Thibault,' the court held that posting a redelivery bond by an attach-
ment defendant who successfully defends against the court action of the
attaching plaintiff does not waive the right to recover for wrongful
attachment.
1149 Wash. Dec. 22, 297 P.2d 954 (1956).
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Defendant in this action, Thibault, had commenced an action against
Adams and had attached the latter's automobile at the outset of the
action. Adams posted a redelivery bond and regained possession of the
automobile. Thibault's suit was dismissed with prejudice whereupon
Adams brought the present suit for the tort of wrongful attachment. The
trial court sustained a demurrer and on appeal, expressly overruling a
case on all fours, the court reversed and remanded the cause.
There are two previous Washington cases that are directly in point:
Brady v. Onffroy,2 and Gutter v. Joiner.' In the Brady case the court
considered a redelivery bond as an unconditional promise by the defend-
ant to pay the judgment of the court, and, under the statute4 it amounted
to a discharge of the writ of attachment. Since the defendant's promise
was unconditional, when plaintiff won his case, the bond became payable
and defendant could not then contest the regularity of the attachment
proceedings. The court held that since the attachment defendant had
had an opportunity to question the regularity of the attachment at the
attachment proceedings, the election to post a redelivery bond was a
waiver of his rights to contest those proceedings.
The court in the Gutter case, relying on the Brady case, affirmed a
judgment for the defendant in an action for wrongful attachment. It is
important to note that in the Gutter case the attaching plaintiff did not
recover in the original action of the debt, whereas in the Brady case the
plaintiff had recovered. Despite a vigorous dissent, the court in the
Gutter case applied the rule from the Brady case and quoted therefrom:
... the bond stands as security for any judgment that may thereafter be
rendered against him in the action, and both he and his surety waive
any right to attack the regularity of the attachment." (Fmphasis
added.) 5
As was pointed out, however, the judgment in the Gutter case was
not thereafter rendered against the defendant; it was rendered against
the attachment plaintiff.
In the Adams case the court, sitting en banc, unanimously overruled
the Gutter case. The court realized that the result of the original action
should determine the effect of the posting of a redelivery bond. If the
attachment plaintiff wins, the defendant has lost his right to question
the attachment. However, if the defendant prevails, any wrongful
-37 Wash. 482, 79 Pac. 1004 (1905).
3 56 Wash. 202, 105 Pac. 457 (1909).
ARCW 7.12250, 7.12.270, and 7.12.290.
5 56 Wash. 202, 203, 105 Pac. 457, 458 (1909).
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attachment thereby becomes actionable. The dissent in the Gutter
case pointed this out, and the court now accepts the principle. It was
also recognized by the Utah court6 which directly rejected the majority
opinion of the Gutter case and considered the dissent in that case as
the proper expression of the law.
The reasoning of the Adams case appears sound. The fundamental
purpose of a redelivery bond is to allow an attachment defendant the
use of the attached property and at the same time indemnify the plain-
tiff from possible loss due to unlawful disposition by the defendant.
The defendant has the right at the attachment proceedings to contest
the regularity of the procedure. RCW 7.12.250 allows him the oppor-
tunity to post a redelivery bond to retain the property. The Brady case
adopted the majority rule8 that having elected to post a redelivery bond,
the defendant had waived his right to contest the authenticity of the
attachment. The reasons for this rule are: the defendant should not be
able to cloud the issue of the alleged indebtedness in the original action;
nor should he, by a later suit for wrongful attachment, unduly delay
satisfaction of the judgment against him. But when the court hears
the original suit and determines that the plaintiff has no cause of action,
the defendant's promise in the bond to satisfy the judgment becomes
a nullity. If the defendant can show in a new suit that the plaintiff's
attachment was tortious, the mere promise made by the defendant to
satisfy an adverse judgment should not preclude him from recovering
from the tort-feasor. If a tort has been committed, damages should be
allowed. The attachment plaintiff is not being treated unfairly; he is
merely paying for his wrongful act.
Formerly, a person with a wholly unfounded claim could attach
maliciously, and, if the defendant desired to retain the use of the prop-
erty during the litigation, the posting of a redelivery bond assured the
plaintiff that no matter how tortious his actions he could not be held
accountable to the defendant. The rule established by the Adams case
should deter unwarranted attachments. The holding allows an alleged
debtor to retain his property and still recover for tortious attachment
if the debt cannot be proved in the subsequent action.
6 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 Pac. 305 (1921).
7 RCW 7.12250: "If the defendant, at any time before judgment, causes a bond
to be executed to the plaintiff with sufficient sureties, to be approved by the officer
having the attachment, or after the return thereof, by the clerk, to the effect that
he will perform the judgment of the court, the attachment shall be discharged and
restitution made of property taken or proceeds thereof. The execution of such bond
shall be deemed an appearance of the defendant to the action."
8 72 A.L.R. 120 (1931).
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Ambiguities of Conditional Sales Contract and Chattel Mortgage.
In the recent case of Smith v. Downs' the court was again confronted
with the problem of whether an agreement was a conditional sales
contract or a chattel mortgage. The plaintiff-vendor brought an
action in replevin for a car which had been sold on an agreement
entitled a conditional sales contract which expressly stated that title
was to remain in the vendor until the full purchase price was paid.
The contract also provided that upon default of payment the vendor
could either sue for the balance of the purchase price, or could re-
possess the car, sell it, and hold the vendee liable for any deficiency.
The court held the agreement to be a chattel mortgage. It quoted ex-
tensively from the case of West American Finance Co. v. Finstad'
In the Finstad case the court said the fact that the instrument was
called a conditional sales contract was not controlling. Neither was
the agreement a conditional sales contract by reason of the provision
that title was to remain in the vendor until the price was paid in full.
The court looked to all of the terms used in the agreement, including
those relating to remedies as well as those relating to substantive
rights.
In the Finstad case, as well as in the Smith case, the agreement pro-
vided, in essence, that in all events the purchaser was liable for the
full purchase price, even though it provided expressly that title was to
remain in the vendor. The vendor was not providing for an election
of remedies, but for cumulative remedies. The result was that the
intent of the parties was ambiguous. The agreement sets up a remedy
which can follow only if title passes to the vendee, but also provides
for a remedy which can arise only if title remains in the vendor. The
court resolved the inconsistency in favor of title passing to the vendee.
Consequently, a chattel mortgage resulted. In the Smith case the
court felt itself bound to accept the line of cases based on the Finstad
case. This prior authority holds an agreement to be a chattel mortgage
when two elements are present: 1) a clause which provides for repos-
session and sale of the chattel in case of default, and 2) a clause which
requires the vendee to pay any deficiency should there be one after
the repossession and sale.
In the Smith case the vendor's brief called the court's attention to
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Hedlund Lmbr. and Mfg. Co.,' but an
148 Wn.2d 165, 292 P.2d 205 (1956).
2 146 Wash. 315, 262 Pac. 636 (1928).
3 164 Wash. 296, 2 P.2d 708 (1931).
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apparent conflict between the Finstad and Allis-Chalmers cases was
ignored. In the latter case the facts were similar to the Smith case,
and the agreement provided that upon default the vendor "... may
pursue all legal remedies to enforce payment hereunder, but if unable
to collect may thereafter repossess the property." The agreement also
provided that title was to remain in the vendor until full payment had
been made. The court in the Allis-Chalmers case stated that a vendor
had merely an election of remedies and could not provide himself
with both. The court then held that the provision which allowed the
vendor to repossess the property if he should be unable to collect must
be stricken from the agreement. The apparent conflict between the
Allis-Chalmers and Finstad cases lies in the court's approach to the
interpretation problem. In the Allis-Chalmers case the vendor, by
stating cumulative remedies, attempted to stipulate a remedy which
was not available under a conditional sales contract. However, in the
Finstad case the court interpreted the remedies clause as expressing
the intent of the parties to pass title to the vendee.
The result of Smith v. Downs appears to be another implied over-
ruling of the Allis-Chalmers case. The Finstad case appears to be
immune from attack.
AlTHuR R. HART
CRIMINAL LAW
Appeal-Preservation of Grounds-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney. In State v. Case' defendant appealed from a conviction
of carnal knowledge, assigning as error a claim that he had been denied
a fair trial because of improper and prejudicial argument by the prose-
cuting attorney. No objections, motions to strike, or instructions to
disregard the remarks of the state's counsel had been made during the
trial, nor did the defendant move for a new trial. On appeal the supreme
court found that the prosecuting attorney had gone beyond the bounds
of proper argument by asserting his personal belief in the guilt of the
accused, by referring to the accused's "herd" of witnesses, and by
making further prejudicial remarks in his closing argument to the jury.
The court, on its own motion, granted a new trial, notwithstanding de-
fendant's failure to preserve the record.
1 149 Wash. Dec. 71, 298 P2d 500 (1956). This was a 7-2 decision. The dissenting
judges, Ott and Mallery, disagreed with the majority's finding that the prosecuting
attorney had made improper and prejudicial argument. They also felt that, even if
there had been improper argument, defendant's failure to raise the question at the trial
level precluded him from raising the question on appeal.
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